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Climate Change, Consequentialism, and the Road Ahead
Dale Jamieson*

Abstract
In this paperI tell the stoy of the evolution of the climate change regime, locating its
origins in "the dream of Rio," which supposed that the nations of the world wouldjoin in
addressing the interlocking crises of environment and development. I describe the failure at
Copenhagen and then go on to discuss the "reboot" of the climate negoiations advocated by
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach. I bring out some ambiguides in their notion of
InternationalPareianism, which is supposed to effectively limit the influence of moral ideals in
internationalaffairs, and pose a dilemma. I go on to discuss the foundations of their views
regarding climate justice, arguing that the most reasonable understandings of theirfavored
theoretical views would not lead to some of their conclusions. Finaly, I return to the climate
regime, and make some observations about the road ahead, concluding thatfor theforeseeable
future the most important climate change action will be within countries rather than among
them.

Professor of Environmental Studies and Philosophy, and Affiliated Professor of Law, New York
University. The author would like to thank all those who participated in the Conference on
Climate Change Justice at The University of Chicago Law School at which an earlier version of
this paper was presented. He would especially to thank Eric Posner and David Weisbach for
organizing the workshop, and for their good comments, and Meg Lippincott for her hard work in
editing the manuscript and also for her very helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, abating
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has been regarded as an urgent global
responsibility.' GHGs linger in the atmosphere for decades, centuries, and even
longer.2 When this is coupled with the fact that their impacts are mediated
through various complex systems, the result is that climate change is practically
irreversible on time scales that most of us care about.3 However, abatement
matters because the nature and severity of the impacts are affected both by the
absolute levels of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and their rates of
increase. Since abating greenhouse gas emissions imposes costs on emitters, the
question of how to allocate these costs fairly has been at the center of climate
ethics. Questions about the fairness of various abatement strategies are
complicated by the fact that land use changes such as deforestation can also
I

2

3

Abatement is usually called "mitigation" in the climate change literature. In chapter 6 of my
forthcoming book, Reason in a Dark Time: Ethics and Politics in a Greenhouse World (manuscript on
file with the author), I argue that "abatement" is a better term for any intentional reduction of
anthropogenic GHG emissions.
Piers Forster, et al, 2007: Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, in S. Solomon,
et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: The Phyical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 212-13,
Table 2.14 (Cambridge 2007).
See Susan Solomon, et al, Persistence of Climate Changes Due to a Range of Greenhouse Gases, 107
Proceedings Natl Acad Sci 18354, 18354-59 (2010); and Susan Solomon, et al, Ireversible Climate
Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 Proceedings Natl Acad Sci 1704, 1704-09 (2009).
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dramatically impact atmospheric concentrations of GHGs both by directly
affecting emissions and by changing the biosphere's ability to sequester carbon.
Unfortunately, these processes are difficult to characterize and measure.
As it has become increasingly clear that we are in the early stages of a
climate change that is likely to continue for centuries even if we pursue
aggressive abatement policies, questions about the fair distribution of the costs
of adaptation have also begun to receive attention. Since the resources that can
be brought to bear on adaptation are limited, questions about setting priorities
are also becoming increasingly important. How do we decide what to save and
what to give up when we cannot protect everything?
Adaptation is motivated by a concern to avoid damages. However, climate
change damages have already occurred and will continue, though it is difficult to
tell exactly what damages can be attributed to climate change and to assess their
extent. Research in this area is ongoing and especially active regarding climate
change impacts on human health. The World Health Organization estimates that
climate change is already causing more than 150,000 deaths per year. This
estimate is controversial but there is little doubt that climate change will cause
millions of deaths or even orders of magnitude more.' Compensating for loss of
life raises special problems, but there is a range of other climate change damages
(for example, property losses) that are straightforwardly compensable. This
raises questions about whether compensation should be paid and, if so, who
should pay whom and how the required compensation should be determined
and delivered.'
4

5

6

The IPCC defines "adaptation" as "adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual
or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities." M.L. Parry, et al, eds, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerabiiy,
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 27, Box TS.3.
(Cambridge 2007). For further discussion, see Paul Baer, et al, Greenhouse Development Rights: A
Frameworkfor Climate ProtectionThat Is 'More Fair"Than EqualPer CapitaEmissions Rghts, in Stephen
M. Gardiner, et al, eds, Climate Ethics: Essential Readings 215-30 (Oxford 2010); Paul Baer,
Adaptation to Clmate Change: Who Pays Whom?, in Gardiner, et al, eds, Climate Ethics 247-62; Dale
Jamieson, Adaptaion, Mitigation, and Justice, in Gardiner, et al, eds, Climate Ethics 263-83; Dale
Jamieson, When UtilitariansShould Be Virtue Theorists, in Gardiner, et al, eds, Cmate Ethics 315-31.
See also W. Neil Adger, et al, eds, Fairnessin Adaptaion to Cmate Change (MIT 2006).
See Anthony J. McMichael, et al, Global Climate Change (Summary Version) in The World Health
Report 2002 71-72 (World Health Organization 2002), online at http://www.who.int/
whr/2002/en/whr02_en.pdf (visited Oct 13, 2012). For a taste of the controversies in this area,
see Andrew C. Revkin, Warming and Death, NY Times (May 29, 2009), online at
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/warming-and-death/ (visited Oct 13, 2012).
For discussion, see Catriona McKinnon, Climate Change and Futurejustice: Precaudon, Compensaion,
and Triage (Roudedge 2012); Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensationfor Victims of Climate Change, 155
U Pa L Rev 1605 (2007). While compensation is discussed in the academic and NGO community,
and increasingly by the leaders of some African countries, it is not central to the current
diplomatic discourse.
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There are also difficult and neglected questions of participatory justice and
how it interacts with distributive concerns. Climate change will remake the world
in which we live and bequeath to our descendants. Generally, the impacts will be
greater on those who contribute little to the problem than on those who
contribute a lot. The forty-two members of the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) emit about 0.5 percent of global GHG emissions and, on a per capita
basis, emit one-quarter as much carbon dioxide as the global average. Yet many
of them will disappear under rising seas.' Sub-Saharan Africans emit about onetwelfth as much carbon per capita as Europeans, who in turn emit about onehalf as much carbon as North Americans, yet sub-Saharan Africans will suffer
disproportionately from climate change and have less capacity to adapt than
Americans or Europeans.! While 194 nations are parties to the UNFCCC and
their diplomats fly around the world in a seemingly endless series of talkathons,
most of these nations have very little power over the forces that actually affect
the global climate, and billions of their citizens have even less voice.' Eighty
percent of global carbon emissions come from only ten countries.o Their
leaders, along with the executives of the world's most powerful corporations,
have disproportionate influence on the decisions that affect emissions and the
resources available for adaptation." While this disparity in the ability of various
nations and their peoples to effectively participate in climate change negotiations
is decried by some academics and NGOs, American academics and
policymakers increasingly seem to want less inclusive regimes.12

7

8

9

10

Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing
Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS), The Impact of Climate Change on the
Development Prospects of the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States (2009), online at
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LDC%/20Documents/The%20impact%/200of/20CC%2
Oon%20LDCs%20and%20SIDS%20for/o20web.pdf (visited Oct 13, 2012).
World Bank, CO emissions (metric tons per capita), online at http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC/countries (visited Nov 4, 2012) (providing data from which these
figures were computed).
To get a feel for what it was like for developing world representatives in Copenhagen in 2009, see
International Institute for Environment and Development, The Climate Game and the World's Poor
Documentary Film from Inside the COPi5 Climate-Change Summit (July 7, 2010), online at
http://www.iied.org/climate-game-world-s-poor-documentary-film-inside-copl5-climate-changesummit (visited Nov 8, 2012). For discussion, see J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley C. Parks, A
Cimate of Injustice: GlobalInequaty, North-South Politics,and Climate Polcy 14-19 (MIT 2007).
See the interactive charts and maps at Cmate Change Trends: Carbon Emissions Giants (NPR), online
at http://www.npr.org/2009/12/11/121240453/climate-change-trends-carbon-emissions-giants
(visited Oct 13, 2012).

11

Id.

12

Indeed, there is reason to be frustrated by the UNFCCC process as I suggest in Section V and
discuss more fully in Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time ch 6 (cited in note 1).
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Finally, there are impacts on non-human nature. Climate change is
occurring against a background in which human activities have already
diminished populations and fragmented landscapes in ways that will reduce
dispersal rates and block range shifts for many species. The 2007
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report documented that
climate change has already shifted the geographic ranges of plants, animals, and
biomes around the world." The ability of many species to migrate, even if
dispersal corridors are available, will be slow relative to the pace of future
climate change. Moreover, since many species engage in mutualistic interactions,
the dispersal dynamics of multiple species can affect the viability of any single
species.14 These and other considerations have led conservation biologists to
generally agree that climate change will raise extinction rates." The polar bear
has already become the popular symbol of climate change-caused extinction.
Given the depth and difficulty of these issues, it seems reasonable to think
that part of why it is difficult to build an effective international climate regime is
because of moral disagreements and differing perceptions of justice. Yet many
commentators, especially those broadly in the tradition of "realism" in
international relations theory, tend to minimize such concerns in favor of such
notions as economic efficiency or self-interest. In this Article I claim that ethics
matters, but the foundations of any particular ethical theory are relatively
unimportant to the decisions we face. Morality matters, but history, context, and
circumstance matter more than abstract principle.
In Section II, I fill in some of the details regarding the evolution of the
climate change regime that are relevant to understanding its current status. In
Section III, I discuss Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach's International
Paretianism (IP), a principle that they seem to believe effectively limits the
influence of moral ideals in international affairs." I go on in Section IV to
discuss the foundations of Posner and Weisbach's views regarding climate
13

14

is

16

See Camille Parmesan and Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate Change
Impacts Across Natural Systems, 421 Nature 37, 37-41 (2003); Patrick Gonzalez, et al, Global
Patterns in the Vulnerability of Ecosystems to Vegetation Shifts Due to Climate Change, 19
Global Ecol and Biogeography 755, 755 (2010); Cynthia Rosenzweig, et al, Attributing Physical
and Biological Impacts to Anthropogenic Climate Change, 453 Nature 353, 353-54 (2008).
See, for example, Iliana B. Baums, A Restoradon Geneics Guide for Coral Reef Conservation, 17
Molecular Ecol 2796, 2796-2806 (2008) (noting the genetic challenges of local adaptation in plant
restoration efforts).
Chris D. Thomas, et al, Extinction Risk from Cmate Change, 427 Nature 145, 145-47 (2008)
(predicting that 15 percent to 37 percent of the study sample species will be "committed to
extinction" due to climate change over the next half century). As a consequence, responses such
as "assisted migration" are increasingly under discussion. See generally Mark W. Schwartz, et al,
Managed Relocation: Integratingthe Scientfic, Regulatory, and EthicalChallenges, 62 BioSci 732 (Aug 2012).
See Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Cmate ChangeJusice(Princeton 2010).
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justice, arguing that the most reasonable versions of their favored theoretical
views would not lead to some of the conclusions that they embrace. Finally, in
Section V, I return to the climate regime and make some observations about the
road ahead.
II. THE DREAM OF RIo
On December 6, 1988, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution
43/53 on the "Conservation of climate as part of the common heritage of
mankind."" This resolution formally recognized the IPCC, set a timeline for its
first report, and provided a framework for moving to a convention."
A. The Run-up to Rio
The stage had been set by a series of events that contributed both to a
sense of urgency about environmental challenges and the feeling that this was a
moment in which decisive, even transformative, action was possible. In 1968, we
were able to see the Earth from space for the first time, and many people
around the world were moved by its lack of borders and apparent vulnerability.
In 1972 in Stockholm, the UN held its first conference on the environment,
which led to the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP). The same year, Nixon went to China, and in the following year, the
Paris Accords were signed, ending American involvement in Vietnam. Detente
with the Soviet Union was growing. In 1977, World Bank President Robert
McNamara, who had been the US secretary of defense during most of the
Vietnam War, announced the creation of a commission that would make
recommendations regarding North-South relations. The resulting Brandt
Commission issued reports in 1980 and 1983 with proposals focusing on food,
agricultural development, aid, energy, trade, and international monetary and
financial reform. The report also discussed the global environment, the arms
race, and population growth. In 1983, the UN General Assembly created the
World Commission on Environment and Development, which popularized the
phrase "sustainable development" in its 1987 report. The resulting book, Our
Common Future,was influential around the world."

18

Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, General Assembly
Res No 43/53, UN Doc A/RES/43/53 (1988).
For the origins of the IPCC, see Shardul Agrawala, Context and Early Origins of the

19

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 39 Climatic Change 605-20 (1998); and Bert Bolin,
A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge 2007).
United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future

17

(Oxford 1987); see also Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time (cited in note 1).
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In Europe especially, environmental consciousness was rapidly growing,
partly in response to concerns about acid rain and fears generated by the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear disaster.2 0 Green political parties were forming all over. Since
most European countries have some system of proportional representation,
these parties were gaining parliamentary seats. The European Union (EU) was
becoming progressively stronger and acting increasingly independently of
individual states. The Greens made their influence felt at both the EU and
national levels. In 1984 they entered the European Parliament and since then
have been continuously represented.2 ' Greens were also becoming increasingly
influential in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union through the emerging social
movements that challenged the power of the state and the Communist Party.
Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 seemed to create new
political possibilities for addressing global environmental problems. In his bold
and wide-ranging 1988 speech to the UN, Gorbachev indicated that the
reformed Soviet Union would play an aggressive role in protecting the global
environment. 22 It seemed there was a real possibility that the East and West
would join in trying to heal the North-South division and address the linked
problems of global environmental destruction, poverty, and underdevelopment.
In 1987 the Montreal Protocol was signed, becoming the first in a series of
international agreements leading to the phasing out of ozone-depleting
chemicals.23 While the possibility that human action could deplete stratospheric
ozone had been discussed and debated since the early 1970s, the 1985 discovery
of the Antarctic ozone hole, which no model had predicted, shocked people
around the world.24 This discovery showed how subtle changes in the
atmosphere can produce surprising, unintended consequences that can threaten
the prospects for life on Earth. The next year UNEP and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) joined to produce an international
scientific assessment of the threat posed by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and
other compounds while expeditions led by Susan Solomon showed that CFCs

20

R. Daniel Kelemen and David Vogel, Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European
Union in InternationalEnvironmentalPohtics, 43 Comp Pol Studies 427, 442-44 (2010).

21

See The Greens: European Free Alliance, Histog, online at http://www.greens-efa.eu/aboutus/50-history.html (visited Oct 14, 2012).
Mikhail Gorbachev, A Road to the Future: Complete Text of the December 7, 1988 United
Nations Address (Ocean Tree Books 1988).

22
23
24

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) (Sept 16,
1987), 1522 UN Treaty Set 29 (1989).
For accounts of the history of this period see Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff, The OZone War
(Doubleday 1978); Richard Elliot Benedick, OZone Deplomay: New Direcionsin Safeguarding the Planet
(Harvard 1991); Edward A. Parson, Protectingthe Otone Layer Science and Strategy (Oxford 2003).
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were indeed implicated in causing the Antarctic ozone hole." The adoption of
the Montreal Protocol, which embodied a system of targets and timetables, was
a great achievement that occurred very quickly by the standards of international
diplomacy. This led to a sense of optimism that, with the help of the scientific
community, the nations of the world could successfully address the problem of
climate change.
In 1988 climate change moved from an issue of public concern to a global
project. Much of the US spent the summer in the grip of extreme heat and
serious drought. Fires raged in Yellowstone National Park, agricultural
production declined dramatically, and water levels in the Mississippi River
system dropped precariously, resulting in channel closings and ship groundings.26
On the Eastern seaboard, demand for electricity hit an all-time high and air
conditioners were even in short supply. On June 23, 1988, a sweltering day in
Washington, DC, climate modeler James Hansen testified before a US Senate
Committee that it was 99 percent probable that global warming had begun.
Hansen's testimony was front-page news in The New York Times and was
extensively covered in other media as well. One week after Hansen's testimony,
a WMO-sponsored conference in Toronto called for a 20 percent reduction in
GHG emissions by 2005. On July 28, Senator Tim Wirth of Colorado, along
with eighteen co-sponsors from both political parties, introduced the National
Energy Policy Act of 1988 calling for a 20 percent reduction in US carbon
dioxide emissions from 1988 levels by the year 2000.27 In a September speech to
the Royal Society, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expressed concern
about climate change, ozone depletion, and acid rain, noting that the five
warmest years in a century were all in the 1980s, and reminded her audience of
the vulnerability of the Maldives to sea level rise.28 1988 was an election year in
the United States and the Democratic Party promised in its platform to "address

2

26

27

28

The theoretical paper is Susan Solomon, et al, On the Depletion ofAntartic Ozone, 321 Nature 75558 (1986). The observational paper is S. Solomon, et al, Visible Spectascopy at McMurdo Station,
Antartica: Observations of OC10, 92 J Geophysical Rsrch 8329, 8329-38 (1987). A narrative
account is available at NOAA Celebrates 200 Years (NOAA 2007), online at
http://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/breakthroughs/ozone/welcome.html (visited Nov 2, 2012).
See, generally, Michael H. Glantz, ed, Sodetal Responses to Regional Cmate Change: Forecasdng by
Analogy (Westview Press 1988); President's Interagency Drought Policy Committee, The Droughtof
1988: FinalReport (Cornell 1988).
S 2667 100th Cong, 2d Sess (Jul 28, 1988), in 134 Cong Rec S 19391 (Aug 1, 1988).
Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the Royal Sodebi (Sept 27, 1988), transcript available online at
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107346 (visited Oct 14,
2012).

446

Vol 13 No. 2

Climate Change, Consequentialism,and the RoadAhead

Jamieson

. . . the 'greenhouse effect."' 29 George H.W. Bush, the Republican candidate,
promised to counter the greenhouse effect with "the White House Effect" and
declared that he would be the "environmental president."o What seemed like a
bidding war over emissions reductions continued in November in Hamburg,
Germany, when the World Congress on Climate and Development called for a
30 percent reduction in emissions by 2000. The year ended with Time Magazine
forgoing its usual "man of the year" in favor of the "planet of the year," with the
"Endangered Earth" depicted as wrapped in plastic and bound in rope.3'
Resolution 43/53 left the IPCC only about eighteen months to produce its
first report. Initially its work was supported and cheered on by virtually every
country in the world. In January 1989 newly appointed US Secretary of State
James Baker spoke at the first meeting of Working Group III, declaring that the
time had come for political action.32 In February 1990 President George H.W.
Bush told the IPCC that "[t]he United States is strongly committed to the IPCC
process of international cooperation on global climate change."" However, in
August 1990 at the IPCC meeting in Sundsvall, Sweden, which had been called
to approve the texts of the three working group reports along with a synthesis
statement, competing political interests and ideologies were on display.
Greenpeace International was present, and so were climate change denial NGOs
such as the Global Climate Coalition and the Global Climate Council, as well as
various fossil fuel interest groups. Under pressure for revisions from the US,
Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union and some developing countries, the meeting
nearly collapsed.34 Finally, however, a text was accepted and after one more
round of ministerial review it was submitted to the UN General Assembly in
October 1990.35

29

Democratic Pary Playforms: Democratic Pary Plafform of 1988 (July 18, 1988), in Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, eds, The American Presidency Project, online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=29609 (visited Oct 14, 2012).

30

See Steve Chapman, The GOP's EnironmentalDisaster It Wasn't Always Against Protecting the Planet,

31

32
33

34
35

Chicago Tribune 23 (Sep 27, 2012); Some White House Efect, NY Times 22 (Apr 21, 1990).
Michael D. Lemonick, Planet of the Year* Global Warming Feeling the Heat, 133.1 Time Magazine 36
(Jan 2, 1989).
Bolin, A Histog of the Science and Potitcs of Climate Change at 53-54 (cited in note 18).
Id at 58.
Gorbachev's grip on power had been steadily weakening and by the end of 1991 the president of
the Soviet Union was no longer a president and there was no longer a Soviet Union.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992), 1771 UN Treaty
Ser 107 (1994).
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B. The Framework Convention on Climate Change
In response, the General Assembly created the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee (INC), whose charge was to prepare a proposal for a
framework convention on climate change that would be acted on at the UN
Conference on Environment and Development, which was to convene in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992. Remarkably, with only eighteen months to act, the INC
was able to agree on a text. The UNFCCC was opened for signature in Rio on
May 9, 1992, and entered into force on March 21, 1994.36
Despite the conflicts, the UNFCCC has won nearly universal acceptance;
there are 194 parties to the convention while the UN has 192 member states.
The parties to the UNFCCC committed themselves to the following:
The ultimate objective of this Convention . .. is to achieve ... stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 38
They would achieve this objective by assuming "common but
differentiated responsibilities." 39 The developed countries would lead the way by
reducing their own emissions and transferring technology and financial
assistance to developing countries. Instead of the mandatory targets and
timetables favored by the EU, AOSIS, and most developing countries but
opposed by the US and the oil-producing states, the UNFCCC incorporated
highly ambiguous language regarding the responsibilities of developed countries
to reduce their emissions. In Article 4.2.a of the convention, each developed
country committed itself to:
[A]dopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the
mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed
countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in
anthropogenic emissions ... recognizing that the return by the end of the
present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases . . . would contribute to such

modification ... .4
In 4.2.c this commitment is referred to as developed countries having "the aim
of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases." The ambiguity of the

36

Id.

37

See UNFCCC, annex I-II (cited in note 35).

38

Id at Art 2.

39

UNFCCC at Art 3.1 (cited in note 35).

4

Id at Art 4.2.a.
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language is indicated by the fact that shortly after the United States signed the
convention in Rio, a Bush policy advisor wrote to a US congressman that "there
is nothing in any of the language which constitutes a commitment to any specific
level of emissions at any time," while the chief British negotiator was quoted as
saying about the same provision that it is "indistinguishable" from an absolute
guarantee. 41
The UNFCCC is a framework convention. What mattered was the way
forward and from the beginning, there were two distinct visions about how it
ought to go. The Europeans and environmentalists were willing to accept the
UNFCCC because they saw this as the first step in a process in which the parties
would take mutually reinforcing positive actions. 42 Developed countries, which
were responsible for 75 percent of CO 2 emissions from 1860-1990 despite
having only 20 percent of the world population,43 would demonstrate the
seriousness of their commitment by voluntarily stabilizing their emissions at
1990 levels by 2000. They would also transfer technology and other resources in
order to enable developing countries to produce greenhouse gas inventories,
take climate change into account in their planning processes, educate their
citizens about climate change, and promote sustainable management." These
initial steps would begin to bend the curve on CO 2 emissions and build
confidence among the parties. During the next period, all countries would share
the burdens of emissions reductions according to the principle of "common but
differentiated responsibilities."
The problem with this approach is that it assumed goodwill and a common
purpose on all sides. However, not everyone wanted global action on climate
change. Most of the oil-producing states were opposed and so were many
influential actors in the US who were motivated by ideology, self-interest, or the
calculus of political advantage. The policies of some nations were unstable (for
example, Canada and Australia), while other important actors were not
committed to either scenario but instead poised to follow a pragmatic or
opportunistic policy. The logic of the optimistic scenario was such that it was
extremely vulnerable to those who were opposed to taking action. If the
naysayers could prevent developed countries from acting in a way that inspired

41
42

Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale
J Intl L 451, 516-17 (1993).
Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time (cited in note 1).

43

Larry Parker and John Blodgett, Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectves on the Top 20 Emitters and
Developed Versus Developing Nations (Congressional Research Service Report 2008), online at
http://earthalliance.net/NLE/CRSreports/08Feb/RL32721.pdf (visited Nov 4, 2012) (providing
data for this estimation and calculation).

44

UNFCCC at Art 4.1 (cited in note 35).
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confidence and trust on the part of developing countries (for example, by
casting doubt on the fairness of the bargain or the willingness of developing
countries ever to do their part), then they would be able to prevent the virtuous
circle of mutually reinforcing positive actions from ever taking hold. Even if the
transition to a carbon-free economy could not be prevented but only delayed,
this would still result in enormous economic benefits for some of the interest
groups involved.45
In January 2009, a new American administration took office. It was
committed both to engaging constructively in the international negotiations to
establish a post-Kyoto climate regime and to reducing emissions domestically
through various policy interventions including the establishment of a cap-andtrade system.46 However, the lesson that it took from the Clinton
administration's failure with the Kyoto Protocol was the importance of linking
international and domestic policy. The Obama administration was not going to
make international commitments that it could not ratify or keep.
C. The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference
The American administration went to Copenhagen in December 2009 with
several disadvantages. First, the Americans had done little to convince the rest of
the world that the US was serious about climate change besides electing a new
president who spoke a different language about climate change and international
cooperation. Second, there was little time for the new administration to engage
meaningfully with the international process prior to Copenhagen. Third, the
negotiations that did occur appear to have been badly managed. Discussions
went forward on two tracks, one that did not include the US regarding post2012 emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, and a second track that
did include the US that discussed long-term cooperative action under the
UNFCCC.4 7
Moreover, the climate change denial campaign escalated once again. Less
than three weeks before the opening of the Copenhagen meeting, emails were
45

46

The delaying game is often self-consciously played by actors with large economic interests at stake
(for example, automakers opposing mandatory seat belts, phase-out of leaded gasoline, etc.). See
Dale Jamieson, The Question of the Environment, in Stefano Rodota and Paolo Zatti, eds, Trattato di
Biodiritto - Ambito e Fonti del Biodiritto 37, 37-50 (Giuffr6 2010). Political actors often benefit from
opposing a policy or regulation, then becoming its champion once it is enacted (for example,
Republicans have tried this tactic with Social Security). And of course some developing countries
(for example, India) have been relieved that the developed countries have been such laggards
since it relaxes the pressure on them to act.
See Eric Pooley, The Climate War 122, 128, 277-81 (Hyperion 2010).

47

Background on the UNFCCC: The Internadonal Response to Cmate Change (UNFCCC), online at

http://unfccc.int/essential-background/items/6031.php (visited Oct 14, 2012).
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hacked from the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia in the
UK and posted on a climate change denial website. The New York Times quoted
prominent climate change deniers including Patrick Michaels who said "this is
not a smoking gun; this is a mushroom cloud."48 The story was picked up by all
the major media and was quickly dubbed "Climategate." Prominent climate
scientists were charged with fabricating research results, misrepresenting data,
and trying to destroy the careers of scientists who disagreed with them. 49 Death
threats spiked against climate scientists. 0 Even some advocates for aggressive
action on climate change expressed disappointment and endorsed some of the
charges that were being made." Finally, months later, after nine separate
investigations, the scientists were exonerated.5 2 No one who was involved in
stealing the emails, making them public, or threatening the scientists has been
brought to justice. Some in the media acknowledged that this was a "highly
orchestrated, manufactured scandal," but the damage had already been done.5 3
Climategate was not the wound that killed Copenhagen but it was one of a
thousand cuts. 54
The divisions that have haunted climate change negotiations from the
beginning hardened and fractured even further in Copenhagen. The United
States was at odds with the EU, and the North was in conflict with the South.

Andrew C. Revkin, Hacked E-MailIs New FodderforClimate Dispute, NY Times Al (Nov 21, 2009),.
For a detailed description of the events of Climategate, see, for example, Fred Pearce, The Cmate
Files: The Battle for the Truth About Global Warming (Guardian Books 2010); Michael E. Mann, The
Hockey Stick and the Climate War: Dispatchesfrom the FrontLines (Columbia 2012).
50 Pearce, The Climate Files at 179-91 (cited in note 49); Leo Hickman, US Cmate Sdentists Receive
Hate Mail Barrage in Wake of UEA Scandal, The Guardian (July 5, 2012), online at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/05/hate-mail-climategate
(visited Oct 18,
2012).
51 George Monbiot, Pretending the Climate Email Ieak Isn't a Crisis Won't Make It Go Away, The
Guardian 16 (Nov 25, 2010).
52 Pearce, The Cmate Files at 219-22 (cited in note 49); Justin Gillis, Climate Sdentist Cleared ofAltering
Data, NY Times A14 (July 2,2010).
53 Sharon Begley, Newspapers Retract "Climategate" Claims, but Damage Still Done (The Daily Beast Jun
25, 2010), online at http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/the-gaggle/2010/06/25/newspapersretract-climategate-claims-but-damage-still-done.html (visited Oct 14, 2012). See also Curtis
Brainard, Wanted: Climate Front-Pager, Colum Journalism Rev (July 7, 2010), online at
http://www.cjr.org/the-observatory/wanted-cimate frontpager.php (visited Oct 14, 2012).
54
A.A. Leiserowitz, et al, Cmategate, Pubc Opinion, and the Loss of Trust, Yale Project on Climate
Change Communication (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies Working Paper
2010), online at http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/Climategate_Opinion-andLoss_of
Trust_ .pdf (visited Oct 14, 2012). For a full account, see Pearce, The Chmate Files (cited in note
49).
55 See generally, Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Inside UN Cmate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference,
27 Rev Poly Rsrch 795 (2010).
48
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AOSIS led by Tuvalu demanded rigorous, legally binding commitments that
almost no one was willing to make." Rifts occurred between large developing
countries such as China and Brazil, and others in the G-77." Countries such as
Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Sudan became increasingly
rejectionist.ss The two negotiating tracks were never successfully brought
together. Many developing countries demanded that any agreement had to be
within the purview of the Kyoto Protocol, a condition that could not be satisfied
by any US government since the Kyoto Protocol was politically dead in the US
and beyond resurrection." New disputes broke out over how to verify national
claims about emission reductions and about the transparency and inclusiveness
of the negotiating process. 0
President Obama remained non-committal about whether he would go to
Copenhagen until November 25, when the White House issued a statement
confirming his attendance and stating the US position. The US would reduce
emissions 17 percent by 2020 from a 2005 baseline and also affirm as "goals"
and "provisional targets" reductions of 30 percent by 2025, 42 percent by 2030,
and 83 percent by 2050."

The President arrived on the morning of the final day of the conference,
going immediately into negotiations with a select group of world leaders and
then emerging for a plenary address. His speech seemed mainly addressed to
Americans rather than to the conference delegates who remained skeptical about
America's good faith. Obama began by acknowledging American responsibility
but in a way that seemed grudgingly tautological: "As the world's largest
economy and the world's second largest emitter, America bears our share of
responsibility in addressing climate change." 62 He went on to boast of a record
that many find altogether lacking if not downright pathetic, mentioning "our
leadership within international climate negotiations" and claiming that "bold

56

Id at 805-07.

s7

The G-77 is an intergovernmental group founded in 1964 to promote its members' collective
economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations. It
now consists of 132 states (including Palestine), and coordinates its policies with China.
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Dimitrov, 27 Rev Poly Rsrch at 810-13 (cited in note 55).
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Id at 803-04, 810-13.
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Id at 810-13.
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The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidentto Attend Copenhagen Climate Talks (Nov
25, 2009), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagenclimate-talks (visited Oct 14, 2012).
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Barack Obama, Speech at United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (Dec 18, 2009),
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/18/obama-inonline
available
transcript
copenhagen-speec-n_396836.html (visited Oct 14, 2012).

452

Vol 13 No. 2

Climate Change, Consequentialism,and the RoadAhead

Jamieson

action" had been taken at home.63 All this, he said, was "ambitious" and he went
on to restate the commitment to the emissions reductions that had been made in
the White House statement.6 4 The speech was not well received. A 17 percent
emissions reduction by 2020 from a 2005 baseline is equivalent to a 4 percent
reduction from the 1990 baseline, by far the weakest offer of any developed
country (except for Canada, which offered a 3 percent reduction).6 ' By contrast,
the EU was offering a 20 percent to 30 percent reduction."
After his speech, Obama went back to negotiations and shortly before
midnight the Copenhagen Accord was unveiled. Draft texts of hundreds of
pages negotiated over two years were replaced with a new declaration of two and
a half pages that went through several drafts, each thinner and vaguer than the
one before. References to emission cuts in developed countries of 50 percent by
2050 and 80 percent were dropped, reportedly at the insistence of China.6 ' The
final text was an agreement negotiated behind closed doors by the US, China,
Brazil, South Africa, and India, and supported by about twenty other parties
including Ethiopia and the European Union.
After a press conference, Obama flew back to the US while the accord
received a tumultuous reception from angry delegates. Rather than adopting or
rejecting the accord, the convention finally agreed to "take note" of it." Most
environmental organizations denounced the accord except for those based in the
US. The executive director of Greenpeace UK declared that "the city of
Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, with the guilty men and women fleeing to
the airport.""

After twenty years of climate diplomacy, the plain fact is that the main
forces that have successfully dampened greenhouse gas emissions have been, in
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Factbox-Climate Negotiating Positions of Top Five Emitters (Reuters Sept 25, 2009), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/25/idUSLP518662 (visited Oct 14, 2012).
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Id.
Mark Lynas, How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room, The Guardian
(Dec 22, 2009), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagenclimate-change-mark-lynas (visited Oct 14, 2012). For more on the process, see Radoslav S.
Dimitrov, Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance, 10 Global Envir Pol 18, 20-23 (2010).
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Times (Dec 19, 2009), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/
20cimate.html?pagewanted=all (visited Oct 14, 2012).
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order of increasing importance: global recession, the collapse of communism,
and China's one child policy."
III. INTERNATIONAL PARETIANISM
From the beginning, some American international relations scholars saw
the Rio approach as misguided.7 2 Even before the signing of the Kyoto Protocol,
they objected to the idea of a comprehensive global treaty with binding national
targets.73 They saw it as a moralistic approach that was doomed to failure. What
was needed was realpolitik and the cold calculus of national interest. To some
extent their predictions of failure were (self) fulfilled.
It is true that the Rio dream was founded on a moral vision. It was
intended to bring some justice to an unjust world. Mutual respect among nations
was supposed to spawn the cooperation that would lead to addressing the twin
problems of environment and development. While this vision might seem
utopian in retrospect, it is difficult to imagine a "realistic" approach to climate
change that does not take justice seriously. It is a fact that climate change
negotiations do not occur in an ethics-free zone. When entertaining fantasies of
technocratic solutions it is good to be reminded that Lumumba Stanislaus-Kaw
Di-Aping, the chief negotiator for the G-77, compared the Copenhagen Accord
to the Holocaust. 74 He was not the only moralist in attendance nor were all the
moralists from developing countries.
A. A Realist Approach to Moralism
Posner and Weisbach are sensitive to the views of both the realists and the
dreamers. They formulate a principle, International Paretianism (IP), that they
think governs state behavior with respect to climate negotiations. They
characterize IP as "a rough attempt to solve the tension between realism and
71

72
7

74

Climate change data reveals that after the collapse of communism, emissions radically declined in
the old USSR and they have only declined in the rest of the world during recessions. See also
"One-Child" Poig Aids Climate Change Battle: China (Terra Daily Mar 11, 2008), online at
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/One-childpolicy-aids-cimate-changebattle China_
999.html (visited Oct 14, 2012) (perhaps overstating, but supporting the fact that China's one
child policy has reduced emissions).
See, for example, David G. Victor, whose book, The Collapse of the Kyoto Pmtocol and the Struggle to
Slow Global Warming (Princeton 2001), was devoted to an event that never actually occurred.
Throughout most of the 1980s Thomas Schelling advocated "pledge and review," a version of
which had been used to implement the Marshall Plan. The Copenhagen Accord is of course a
"pledge and review" system. See Thomas C. Schelling, Some Economics of Global Warming, 82 Am
Econ Rev 1, 12-13 (1992).
See Ambassadorfor G77 Gives Martin Luther King Speech of the 21st Century at COP15 (YouTube Dec
11, 2009), online at http://www.youtube.com/watchv=s0_wyZw0fOU (visited Oct 14, 2012).

454

Vol. 13 No. 2

Climate Change, Consequentialism,and the RoadAhead

Jamieson

idealism"" and formulate it in this way: "[A]ll states must believe themselves to
be better off by their lights as a result of a climate treaty.""
Putting aside the question of what it is for states to have propositional
attitudes such as beliefs, it is clear that this is a weak subjective principle. For IP
to be satisfied, a climate treaty does not have to actually make states better off by
their own lights nor do they even have to be generally perceived to be better off
by their own lights. States could be wrong about thinking that a climate treaty
makes them better off and IP would still be satisfied. Moreover, in this
formulation IP does not restrict what states may regard as making themselves
better off. A state could have an eccentric or weird idea of what makes it better
off (for example, a large military, large numbers of hedge fund managers, or a
vast number of religious scholars). Or a state could be highly moralistic,
believing that its own welfare is a function of everyone's welfare. For example, a
state might actually believe what John F. Kennedy said at the Berlin Wall in June
1963, that "[fjreedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not
free." 7 IP would be satisfied so long as states believed that a climate treaty
would produce favorable results for them whatever these favorable results might
consist in. In this formulation, IP is so weak that it comes close to saying
nothing more than that if there is to be a climate treaty then states must desire
what they take to be the results of such a treaty.
However, Posner and Weisbach are not consistent in their interpretation of
IP. In other passages they seem to take IP to be an objective principle about
economic welfare.7 ' They talk about a climate treaty "redistributing wealth" and
claim that "a climate treaty that produces net costs ... violates the condition of
International Paretianism."" But it does not follow from the original
formulation of IP that a treaty that produces net economic costs violates IP. If
nations construct their interests in terms other than wealth (for example, the
triumphal march of democracy, capitalism, socialism, or whatever), then IP may
be satisfied even if a treaty produces net economic costs. Indeed, Posner and
Weisbach go on to say that behaving altruistically can be part of a nation's
interest and so an agreement with some degree of altruism can in principle
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Posner and Weisbach, Climate Changejusice at 181 (cited in note 16).
Id at 6.
John F. Kennedy, Speech in Berkn (June 26, 1963), online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/3022166.stm (visited Oct 14, 2012).
In their contribution to this issue they renounce this interpretation.
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Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Jusice at 93 (cited in note 16).
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satisfy IP." In practice, however, they think that IP "probably requires that all
states that participate in a climate treaty are economically better off.""
B. A Dilemma for IP
Posner and Weisbach think that IP is a "pragmatic starting point for
negotiations," but it is difficult to see why.82 A weak reading of IP does not
significantly restrict the domain of possible climate treaties. A strong reading of
IP in which welfare is conceived as objective economic welfare would be
empirically false. Nations often seem to take actions that are against their
economic interests. They fight wars against drugs and terrorism, and in favor of
human rights or democracy in remote parts of the world. Of course, it can be
said that there are subtle arguments that show that such actions are in the
economic interests of a state; that in supposing otherwise, we are not correctly
pricing the economic importance of intimidating demonstrations of state power
deterrence, or whatever. Consider a small example. Over the past thirty-four
years the state of California has spent $4 billion executing thirteen prisoners for
capital crimes." Even in this case someone could say that the executions pass
some cost-benefit analysis (what a grisly thought!). However, at some point it
becomes clear that such claims are vacuous. States can act contrary to their
interests perhaps even by signing up to a climate treaty (isn't that what some of
the critics thought the US did in Kyoto?). To suppose otherwise is to treat IP as
an axiom rather than as an empirical claim open to falsification, and it is difficult
to see how such an axiom can function as a "pragmatic starting point."
In their contribution to this issue Posner and Weisbach agree that IP
should not be treated as an axiom. What they want is for IP to function as a
feasibility constraint. They think we should focus not only on what is ethically
acceptable but also on what is politically feasible, and they think that proposed
climate treaties that are extremely redistributive are not feasible.84 However, the
real work in supporting this claim is done not by IP but by Posner's and
Weisbach's empirical beliefs about the economics of various possible climate
s0

Id at 177-78.
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Id at 181.
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More Evidence Against the Death Pena4y, NY Times A30 (Apr 13, 2012).
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See Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, InternationalParetianism:A Defense, 13 Chi J Intl L 347,
349 (2013). I am with them on this point. Philosophers often distinguish "ideal" from "non-ideal"
theory and then largely ignore the latter. John Rawls introduced this distinction (which he tended
to conflate with the full/partial compliance distinction) in his magisterial, A Theof of Justice
(Harvard 1971), a work that is almost entirely devoted to ideal theory. When writing about the
problems of partial compliance Rawls acknowledged that "[t]hese are the things that we are faced
with in everyday life." Rawls, A Theory oflustice at 9.
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treaties, what different countries believe about the economics, and how
economic considerations are traded off against other values in various countries.
All of this is very dark, and Posner and Weisbach mobilize little empirical
support for their substantive claims. There is serious disagreement about the
economics of climate change which turns in part on various normative
commitments (for example, about pure time preference), and certain empirical
assumptions for which there is little evidence (for example, the growth rate over
the next few centuries)." Moreover, nations have different attitudes toward the
importance of economic considerations and how to trade them off against other
values. No doubt there are practical limits on how economically redistributive a
treaty can be and still gain universal acceptance, but IP in its various
formulations does little to illuminate them. The question that repays
investigation is not whether there is some set of feasibility constraints on the
space of universally acceptable climate treaties, but rather, what are the
considerations that can motivate diverse agents to cooperate in addressing the
problems we face here and now. As we saw in the previous section, it is difficult
to understand the behavior of the European Union in the climate negotiations
without recognizing that green ideas are more widely and intensely shared in
many European countries than in the United States. Similarly, it is difficult to
understand American behavior without recognizing the suspicion of treaties and
international organizations that is characteristic of many Americans. It is
considerations such as these that help us to understand what is possible in the
climate negotiations.
IV. WELFARISM AS A FOUNDATION
The general philosophical outlook that motivates Posner and Weisbach is
what they call "welfarism," which they contrast with what they call
"deontological approaches," which "focus on the rightness or wrongness of
particular acts independent of their consequences . . . [while t]he welfarist

approach approves of acts that increase the welfare of relevant people (and
perhaps animals)."" They go on to say that welfare can consist of a "subjective
sense of well-being, satisfaction of desires or preferences, or satisfaction of
certain objective parameters.""
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See Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time (cited in note 1).
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A. Welfarism, Consequentialism, and Utilitarianism
Posner and Weisbach's notion of welfarism is a confusing hybrid of a
deontic theory (consequentialism) and an axiological theory." The passage
quoted above embodies a false contrast between a deontic view about what
makes acts right and an axiological view about what is morally valuable. A
proper deontic contrast is between consequentialism and non-consequentialist
views such as deontology; a correct axiological contrast is between views such as
welfarism and non-welfarist views that count other kinds of goods as morally
valuable instead or in addition. Matters are further confused by Posner and
Weisbach's willingness to count a non-welfarist axiology ("satisfaction of certain
objective parameters") as an instance of welfarism.
Consequentialism is the view that acts are right, wrong, or indifferent solely
in virtue of their consequences." Since consequentialism is consistent with a
broad range of theories of value, and since part of what Posner and Weisbach
mean by "welfarism" is consequentialism, it is not surprising that their
understanding of welfare is quite broad.
However, there are limits on what theories of value can reasonably be
called welfarist. For example, Hastings Rashdall, one of the ideal utilitarians who
flourished in the first half of the twentieth century, held that virtue and veracity
are among the goods that we ought to promote.90 There is no guarantee that
bringing about such goods will contribute to welfare in any reasonable sense of
the term. Promoting veracity and virtue may result in misery and early death.
Rather than thinking of philosophers such as Rashdall as welfarists, it is more
reasonable to think of them as non-welfarist consequentialists."
88

89
90
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One stream of the literature tends to conflate the axiological theory of welfarism with the deontic
principle of consequentialism (see, for example, Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and FairDistribution:
Beyond Cost-BenefitAna/ris 32-56 (Oxford 2012), and Roger Crisp, Well-Being, in Edward N. Zalta,
ed, The Stanford Engclopedia of Philosophy (The Metaphysics Research Lab 2008)). Even understood
as an axiological theory welfarism seems to embody two distinct dimensions: one that specifies
that the value of states of affairs is a function of "personal utilities," and a second which restricts
the nature of these utilities. See Amartya Sen, Utilitananism and Wefarism, 76 J Phil 463, 463-89
(1979). Unfortunately, as Simon Keller notes, "[i]n the philosophical literature, direct discussion
of welfarism is rare, and those who do discuss it offer differing stories about what welfarism is,
exactly, and about which views in moral philosophy are consistent with it." Simon Keller,
Wefatirm, 4 Phil Compass 82, 83 (2009).
For further discussions see Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction 76-85
(Cambridge 2008).
For discussion, see Anthony Skelton, Ideal Utiktarianism:Rashda/l and Moorn, in Thomas Hurka, ed,
UnderivativeDuty 45, 45-65 (Oxford 2011).
This is also how Keller regards them. While it is more difficult to think of non-consequentialists
who have been welfarists, Keller suggests that versions of welfarist deontology and virtue theory
may count as such. Keller, 4 Phil Compass at 88-89 (cited in note 88).
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In addition to being consistent with a broad range of axiological theories,
consequentialism is also consistent with a broad range of deontic principles
including both maximizing and satisficing principles." Posner and Weisbach
seem to endorse this when they write that "[m]any different forms of
aggregation are consistent with welfarism" and state that utilitarianism is only
one such version." Yet they also say that "[w]elfarists seek policies that
maximize people's well-being," thus effectively identifying welfarism with
utilitarianism. 4
While pointing out these inconsistencies may seem like philosophical nitpicking (which is worth doing for its own sake anyway), some of Posner and
Weisbach's conclusions regarding climate justice rely on specific views in ethical
theory that are obscured by their use of the term "welfarism." It is not a general
commitment to welfarism or consequentialism that leads Posner and Weisbach
to minimize the roles of distributive justice, corrective justice, and equality in
climate justice, but rather their de facto commitment to a crude version of
utilitarianism that reduces value to money. While they do not explicitly endorse
such a view or even consistently presuppose it, it is difficult to make sense of
some of their arguments without attributing some such view to them.9 5
B. Putting the Justice into Climate Justice
The role that is played by Posner and Weisbach's utilitarianism can be seen
in their rejection of proposals to create an international system of emissions
trading, based on an initial equal per capita allocation of permits among
countries." Both Peter Singer and I have advocated such a system but neither of

92

93

94
95

96

For discussion see Dale Jamieson and Robert Elliott, Progressive Consequentiaksm, 23 Phil
Perspectives 241 (2009).
Posner and Weisbach, Cmate ChangeJuslice at 217 n 7 (cited in note 16).
Id at 171.
However, it should be noted that many of their claims do not presuppose such a commitment
and are widely shared by theorists who have diverse normative views. For example, many climate
ethicists (myself included) agree that a climate treaty should not be a vehicle for the general
redistribution of wealth according to some broad principle of distributive justice. There is also
substantial literature pointing out that there are difficulties in applying standard principles of
corrective justice to actions that may cause climate change. See, for example, Jamieson, When
Utiitadans Should Be Virtue Theorists, in Gardiner, et al, eds, Climate Ethics 315, 315-31 (cited in
note 4); Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 Envir L 1 (2011).
Finally, reconciling cosmopolitan concerns with the existing state system is a major challenge, as
Posner and Weisbach point out, and is acknowledged by many political theorists.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice 119-43 (cited in note 16).
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us has felt any tension between these views and broadly consequentialist (and
welfarist in the proper sense) convictions.9 7
Posner and Weisbach consider two bases for the view that emissions
permissions should be allocated on an equal per capita basis: one founded on
welfarism and another founded on fairness.
Posner and Weisbach assume that a welfarist argument for an equal per
capita allocation must rest on two factors: distribution and efficiency. While they
are not completely clear about why a welfarist would argue on the basis of
distribution, it appears that the reason concerns diminishing marginal utility.
Generally, a unit of a resource produces more utility when allocated to someone
who has less of the resource than to someone who has more." Posner and
Weisbach point out that a system of equal per capita allocation is at best "only
indirectly connected to the underlying normative goal" of increasing global
welfare and that it "would be much better to redistribute all resources than to
redistribute shares of the atmosphere's capacity to absorb greenhouse gases.""
They go on to claim that equal per capita allocations would be inefficient
because "[g]overnments would be rewarded for pursuing fertility policies that
maximize the size of the population"' 00 and that such a system "punishes states
that do well, while rewarding states that do poorly. . . . From an efficiency

perspective, the best use of the surplus [generated by any climate treaty that
satisfies IP] would be to reward the states that had taken steps in advance of the
treaty to abate the greenhouse gases.""o' While granting that "there are
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See Dale Jamieson, Climate Change and GlobalEnvironmentalJustice,in Paul N. Edwards and Clark A.
Miller, eds, Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance 287, 287-307
(MIT 2001); and Peter Singer, One Atmosphere, in Gardiner, et al, eds, Cimate Ethics 181, 181-99
(cited in note 5). Singer and I were developing a view that was already in circulation, notably in
Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental
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(visited Oct 14, 2012). See also Darrel Moellendorf, Common Atmospheic Ownership and Equal
Emissions Entitlements, in Denis Arnold, ed, The Ethics of Global Cmate Change 104 (Cambridge
2011).
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complexities here," they go on to stay that "[Lt]hese states would probably be the
European states that accepted binding reductions under the Kyoto Protocol."' 02
While these arguments have some force, quite a lot can be said in response
to them, though I cannot do full justice to the details here. In my 2001
presentation of the equal per capita allocation proposal, I anticipated the
objection regarding perverse incentives for fertility rates and suggested that the
per capita allocation be indexed to a particular year. Singer took up this
suggestion in his presentation.103 While there have been objections to such
indexing as a solution, the problem has not been ignored. Second, while it is
important from an efficiency perspective to consider the incentive effects of
various institutional arrangements, it is far from clear that the most efficiencyconducive allocation of a climate treaty surplus would be to reward those who
have acted well in the past. It is an entirely open empirical question as to
whether allocating resources in this way would do the most to incentivize
efficiency-producing behavior in the future.
The most important point is keyed by Posner and Weisbach's observation
that a system of equal per capita allocation is at best "only indirectly connected
to the underlying normative goal." They are right about this. Utilitarianism is
highly context-sensitive, and the level at which its guiding principle should be
applied is always a question worth asking. As I have said elsewhere, utilitarianism
is a universal emulator: it implies that people should lie, cheat, steal, even
appropriate Aristotle, when that is what brings about the best outcomes.104
Something like this thought has been central to utilitarian thinking since at least
Jeremy Bentham and has figured in the development of many different versions
of indirect consequentialism, including rule consequentialism, virtue
consequentialism, global consequentialism, and so on. It has also led particular
utilitarians to endorse actions and policies that perhaps would not be
countenanced in a utilitarian utopia.'" Most utilitarians consider the indirectness
of the relations between principles and policies to be a feature, a consequence of
applying their views to the world in which we live rather than as an objection to
their theory.
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105 The supposed act-utilitarian Bentham spent much of his life working on constitutional codes,

John Stuart Mill was a strong advocate of rights to liberty, and many contemporary
consequentialists have defended the importance of "associative" duties such as those that spring
from friendship. Real utilitarians tend not to spend much time in the airy domain of unreal theory.
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For these reasons (and others), it is important not to exaggerate the
practical and middle-level differences between consequentialism and other moral
theories. Consequentialists can appeal to such notions of fairness as part of the
good (a view I haven't discussed), and insofar as these notions are important to
people and motivate their behavior it would be a mistake for consequentialists to
ignore them. What consequentialists cannot say is that such notions figure at the
foundations of morality as independent deontic considerations. This is where the
clash of moral theories really occurs. However, since Posner, Weisbach, and I
agree that the best climate policy is one that is both ethically acceptable and
politically feasible, it should not be surprising that the best climate policy might
be one that incorporates values that do not occur at the very foundations of the
best moral theory.
Whatever the best moral theory, it is clear that perceptions of fairness
matter to people.' 6 There is a large body of empirical evidence that shows that
we will inflict costs on ourselves in order to punish those who violate norms. 0 7
It should thus not be surprising that concerns about fairness loom very large in
the climate change debate, perhaps especially outside the US.1'8 In light of such
considerations, both Singer and I appeal to fairness as well as welfare in arguing
for an equal per capita allocation.1 We do not see ourselves as having to choose
between these considerations. We can care about fairness because we care about
welfare.
However, Posner and Weisbach do not think that arguments from fairness
work any better than welfarist arguments in supporting equal per capita
allocations. To a great extent the difference between us turns on what we think
fairness implies with respect to the atmosphere.
Many climate ethicists think that people have equal rights to use the
atmosphere as a sink for greenhouse gases and that the extent of these rights is
determined in part by some threshold such that the consequences would be
close to universally unacceptable if it were exceeded.' They believe this because
they can find no morally relevant reason for supposing that some people have
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rights to use the atmosphere that are not available to others. However this view
is filled in, it leads naturally to the conclusion that many of those currently alive
in rich industrial countries are exploiting the atmosphere beyond their
entitlements."
Posner and Weisbach disagree with this conception of rights to the
atmosphere. They think that emitters who on equal per capita allocation would
not receive emissions permissions equal to their current emissions "should be
compensated for the lost investment that they made in the reasonable
expectation that their rights would continue as in the past."" 2
I can imagine why someone might hold such a view with respect to a
renewable resource. If a resource is not threatened by exhaustion and I have
built my economy and way of life around exploiting this resource to a greater
extent than other people, I can understand why someone might think that this
entitles me to continue my exploitation at the same level. However, if the
resource is exhaustible and I have already exploited it to a greater extent than
others then I can see no reason why the fact that I have overexploited this
resource in the past should give me a right to continue overexploiting it in the
future. Suppose that mother gives us ten cookies and I eat four of the first five
and then claim that this entitles me to eat four of the last five cookies as well.
You might think that I am a good candidate for law school but you are unlikely
to be persuaded by my argument.
Many scholars think that in order to avoid climatic disruption humans
must cumulatively emit less than a trillion tonnes of carbon." 3 On this view
there are about 440 billion tonnes that can still be emitted.1 4 It is difficult to see
why anyone would think that some countries (or people) are entitled to emit a
disproportionate share of the last 440 billion tonnes on the grounds that they
emitted a disproportionate share of the first 560 billion tons.
The only other argument that I can imagine in support of Posner and
Weisbach's claim would be one that holds that the present allocation of
emissions is economically efficient, at least compared to an equal per capita
allocation, and that this consideration has sufficient moral weight to trump other
considerations. This view is not only implausible in its own right but the concern

111 There are various ways of filling in this argument including appeals to Lockean notions of
property and ideas of unjust enrichment. For further discussion see Daniel A. Farber, Clmate
justice, 110 Mich L Rev 985 (2012); and Paul Harris, World Ethics and Cmate Change: From
Internationalto GlobalJurtice(Edinburgh 2010).
112 Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 136 (cited in note 16).
113 The primary scientific source of this view is Myles R. Allen, et al, Warming Caused by Cumulative
Carbon Emissions Towards the Trilonth Tonne, 458 Nature 1163 (2009).
114
See id at 1163.
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with initial allocation is not in the spirit of those who highly value efficient
outcomes. They often defend unequal initial allocations by drawing on the Coase
Theorem to show that efficient outcomes are distribution-insensitive under
certain ideal conditions."' Indeed, the only moral theorists I know who would
endorse the argument that I am imagining would be a certain kind of utilitarian
with a quite reductive theory of value. These are scarce on the ground, at least in
philosophy departments."'
In this section I have claimed that Posner and Weisbach do not clearly
develop and defend their foundational moral views and that in any case much of
what is in dispute in the domain of climate justice does not turn on such
foundational questions. Welfarist consequentialists as well as deontologists can
defend trading schemes that allocate emissions permissions on an equal per
capita basis."'
V. CONCLUSION: SLOUCHING TOWARD THE FUTURE
Posner and Weisbach see the fundamental challenge of climate justice as
one of achieving an optimal climate treaty and then deciding how to allocate the
surplus."' Some international relations theorists see the challenge in similar but

less economistic terms, as one of producing the benefits of international
cooperation while respecting national interests."' However, we are now in a
situation in which there appear to be few benefits to allocate and many costs to
avoid.
The problem of how to allocate future greenhouse gas emissions was once
perhaps the most salient question about climate justice, but its importance has
receded as it has become increasingly likely that tolerable emissions limits will be
breached before any such system can be put in place. Other issues concerning
adaptation and compensation are now of more immediate concern. I see the
main challenge of climate change as involving all of the following:
slowing or reducing the build-up of GHG concentrations in the
atmosphere;
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*

adapting to climate change in a world characterized by radical inequality,
mutual suspicion, and diverse values;
* living with an awareness that there is some chance that increasing GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere could be catastrophic;
* all this while protecting what we value, which includes features of nonhuman nature as well as economic welfare.
There is no general or abstract solution to this problem. What we should
do next is path-dependent. The economics of climate change (for example) are
extremely policy-sensitive. Innovations that internalize externalities or create
cooperative arrangements among countries and other actors can contribute to
economic welfare, which in turn would ramify into the future. If key nations had
behaved in the way envisioned by the Rio dream, would these nations or the
world be better or worse off than they are today? This is a good question that I
don't know how to answer. It is made even more difficult by the considerations
adduced earlier regarding the value-ladenness of economic calculations and the
difficulty of valuing non-market impacts of climate change that will unfold over
centuries.
Some would say that whatever the truth about climate economics, the Rio
dream was bound to fail because key nations were not going to cooperate given
the world as it is. But how do we know this? Could anything else have worked
better? Some theorists today talk about the importance of broadening the
negotiations beyond climate so that every party to the negotiation will find
something from which to benefit.'20 But the Rio dream did involve broad
negotiations on topics including forestry and biological resources as well as
climate and the infrastructure of development. Telling the story as one that was
doomed to failure may simply transform the contingent political success of some
interest groups (for example, the US Chamber of Commerce, Exxon, the right
wing of the Republican party) into necessary truths about international relations.
My hunch is that the Rio dream could have succeeded but I have no way of
proving it.
What is clear is that our world would be quite different if the Clinton
administration had acted to reduce US emissions rather than sitting on its hands
after its failure to enact a BTU tax. Perhaps in order to do this, the Clinton
administration would have had to succeed on health care reform and then used
its accrued political capital on climate change. Or perhaps it would have been
enough had Clinton not had to admit to an "improper physical relationship"
120
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with an intern after denying that he had "sexual relations with that woman." In
any case, the world is where it is and it matters how it got here. The bruises that
the world wears as a result matter, too. History is important.
The dream of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit came to an end in Copenhagen
in 2009.121 That the dream is over does not mean that everyone is awake. The
UN will continue to hold successful meetings since UN meetings never fail.
Diplomats will continue to diplomatize, talking heads will keep talking, and all of
this will seem Very Important to Very Important People. However, all of this toing and fro-ing will be in the service of a zombie negotiation. While bodies and
mouths continue to move, it is increasingly obvious that the action is elsewhere.
The international climate negotiations are now part of a broader effort at global
regulation involving trade, immigration, human rights, currency, capital flows,
and other issues. Efforts to control the forces that give rise to these problems
will continue. "Clubs" that take climate change seriously will eventually form.
There will be discussions, decisions, and perhaps even agreements, some of
which may actually be kept. Someday, perhaps, these efforts will result in an
international regime that is responsive to the anthropogenic destabilization of
the climate system. But don't hold your breath.
In the interim, climate politics and policy will continue to be practiced.
Motivation, not feasibility, will be the most important challenge (we are not
ambitious enough for feasibility to be a major obstacle). The ongoing problem is
how to get anybody to do anything together in a sustained way that will be
effective. Rather than based on a global deal, for the foreseeable future climate
policy will largely reflect the motley collection of policies and practices adopted
by particular countries. It will be driven by national and regional efforts rather
than by large schemes and big dreams. In every country there are political
divisions about how to respond to climate change, and domestic politics will
become increasingly important in determining the global response. This will all
seem rather drunk and disorderly. What countries do (and fail to do) will reflect
their internal politics, values, fears, ambitions, and national priorities. There will
be climate-relevant action, but it will be different in different countries and it will
be pursued under different descriptions and with different objectives. Some
countries will adopt emissions trading, others carbon taxes, and still others
technology forcing policies. Some countries will alter their energy mix, others
their transportation systems, and others their buildings. Some countries will do a
lot and others will do a little. An election may change a leader into a laggard or a

121 I more or less predicted this in Dale Jamieson, The Post-Kyoto Ckmate: A Gloomy Foncast,20
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laggard into a leader. 122 Urban sustainability and resilience will become
increasingly important everywhere. In some countries there will be a great deal
of sub-national variation, while other countries will have nationalized and even
to some extent internationalized their policies. These policies, in different
proportions depending on the country, will reflect a mix of self-interest and
ethical ideals. These notions of self-interest and ethical ideals will be constructed
in different ways in different countries. Any international agreement will be a
matter of an overlapping consensus. No comprehensive doctrine has a chance in
this fragmented world.123
While the global environmental movement has not succeeded in
motivating the countries of the world to adopt an effective global climate
regime, it has succeeded in insinuating itself into the political fabric of virtually
every country, even those such as the US that are the most recalcitrant on
climate change. In the sober light of these new realities, old stereotypes about
northern environmentalism in conflict with southern development priorities
should be discarded or refigured. In elections held in 2010, the Green Party
candidate for president of Brazil received nearly 20 percent of the vote, while the
Green Party in Great Britain captured only about 1 percent of the vote. 2 4 Of
course, much can be said to show why these numbers do not really mean what
they seem to mean. Nevertheless, it is clear that seismic changes are underway in
the configuration of global environmentalism. The site of the global struggle to
stabilize climate is now primarily within countries rather than among them.12 5
US policy in the next several years will be driven by the effectiveness and
resiliency of state laws and policies such as those in place in California, and
regional institutions such as the East Coast's Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI). In addition, attempts to regulate carbon dioxide under the Clean Air
Act and the vast amount of litigation slowly working its way through the courts
will also be extremely influential, perhaps mainly for its political effects.'2 6
Ongoing attempts to reframe climate change are also important. Thus far, none
of these attempts to reframe climate change as an issue about energy, green jobs,
122
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or concern for our children has had much traction.12 A narrative may come
along in the future that will move people and organize our thoughts and feelings
about climate change in a way that will be effective. Perhaps geoengineering will
catch the popular imagination. In the meantime we live in the wreckage of the
old story.128
So we will have to live with climate change. We will have to find meaning
and joy in a world that increasingly fails to resemble the one in which we came
to consciousness. The biota will change, diversity will diminish, weather will be
less stable, skies will be different, and it will become increasingly difficult to
relate to the old stories and tales. We will have to live in the knowledge that this
is not like "an asteroid from space," but the result of patterns of human action
in which we persist.129 For some, this will mean grief and guilt. For others, it will
mean suffering. For still others, it will be just another day at the office. This will
be life in the anthropocene. Climate change will trouble us but there is no magic
bullet solution. John Wayne is dead and there is no Colt .45 peacemaker in sight.
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